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Abstract | In the 1960s, Takeuchi Yoshimi urged a public debate over the “Meiji 
Restoration centennial.” Concerned about the potential for the marginalized and 
suppressed “national perspective” to emerge as “ultranationalism,” Takeuchi called on 
the “pro-West” and “pro-Japan” factions to jointly seize the initiative with respect to the 
“national issue.”
 The discourse surrounding the “Meiji Restoration centennial” in the 1960s initially 
developed relative to its encounter with American modernization theory, provoking a 
“Meiji boom,” or the idea that the Meiji era was a “successful case of modernization” 
(Meiji = modernity). Meanwhile, debates over the Meiji centennial were preceded by 
those over the “postwar vicennial.” Following declarations of “the end of the postwar” 
and a progressive “transformation” in the social and economic structure of the nation, 
the notion of “postwar” became synonymous with “democracy.” Engaging with these 
developments, the discourse on the Meiji centennial passed into a new phase defined by 
the question: “Is it [more important to celebrate the] Meiji [centennial] or the postwar 
[vicennial]?” The debate thus evolved into a conflict between establishment and anti-
establishment factions. It was at this time that Takeuchi retracted his comments on the 
Meiji centennial.
 Ultimately, it was economic nationalism, rather than the “ultranationalism” (kageki 
na nashonarizumu) that had concerned Takeuchi, that emerged as the dominant 
discourse to accompany the Meiji centennial. This new form of ultranationalism was 
based upon the intellectual and material developments that accompanied the ascendant 
contexts of modernization theory, “transformation,” and high economic growth during 
the 1960s. Takeuchi’s attempt to seize the initiative regarding the national issue through 
debate over the Meiji centennial was thus interrupted before the effectiveness of his idea 
to create a more progressive nationalist discourse could be realized. With the 150th 
anniversary of the Meiji Restoration in 2018, concerns over “ultranationalism” have 
once again emerged alongside the “intellectually sterile” idea of “Meiji versus postwar.” 
A return to the unfinished debate of the 1960s thus also holds significance for 
contemporary Japan.
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Introduction
In 2018, Japan commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration. 
As expected, the Japanese government organized events such as the 150th 
Anniversary of the Meiji Restoration Memorial Ceremony (Constitution 
Memorial Hall [Kensei Kinenkan], October 23, 2018) to link the future of Japan 
with the “Meiji ascent.” With publications and plans related to the anniversary of 
the Meiji Restoration ubiquitous in public forums and the media, a certain 
dynamic emerged reminiscent of the Meiji centennial commemoration. As critic 
of the “post-postwar” generation1 Azuma Hiroki (1971- ) observed, Japan was 
once again reducing everything to a polarized notion of “postwar or Meiji” 
(Azuma 2018). Literary critic Katō Norihiro (1948-2019), a member of the “1968 
Zenkyōtō generation,”2 further emphasized that what Japan needed at this time 
was not a sense of attempting to trace modern national history through the 
competitive oppositional dichotomy of “Is it postwar or Meiji?” that had defined 
the “Meiji centennial,” but a new expansive emphasis on “neither postwar nor 
Meiji.” To confront the discourse of “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” 
(sonnō jōi), which has periodically resurfaced in Japan over the past eighty years, 
and is arguably bound to resurface in the future, Katō argued for a “three 
hundred-year perspective.” The aim of this would be to locate the origin of con- 
temporary Japan prior to Meiji and the postwar in the early Edo period (Katō 
2017, 62-63). In similar terms, Azuma declared that avoiding the “intellectual 
sterility” of the “Is it Meiji or the postwar?” debate depended on the creation of a 
liberal nationalist historical ideology tempered by a “three hundred-year 
perspective.”
Public debate in the 1960s over the conflict between Meiji and the postwar 
was initially not adversarial. The discussion began with Takeuchi Yoshimi’s 
(1910-77) comments regarding the “Meiji Restoration centennial.” Takeuchi 
called on the pro-West and pro-Japan factions to jointly seize the initiative with 
respect to the national issue to preempt an extreme nationalist backlash.3 
Retracing how the “Meiji versus postwar” problem emerged out of the Meiji 
centennial discourse is therefore relevant in considering the latest intellectual 
attempts to deal with the recent problem of extreme nationalism that has 
resurfaced with the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration.
1. Here, the “post-postwar” generation refers to Japanese born after 1970 (Katō 1998, 5).
2. The generation that experienced the 1968 student movement led by the “All-Campus Joint 
Struggle Committee” (Zengaku Kyōtō Kaigi).
3. The conflict between the “pro-West” and “pro-Japan” factions in Japan was analogous to the 
conflict between the “pro-West” and “pro-Slav” (i.e. nationalist) factions in Russia.
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“Meiji Restoration Centennial” Discourse: Seizing the Initiative 
Regarding the National Issue
Declarations on the end of the “postwar” in Japan began with the publication of 
the 1956 Economic White Paper. In contrast to its original purpose, the White 
Paper’s declaration that “it is no longer the postwar” came to hold a place in the 
collective national memory as a powerful slogan heralding a bright future.4 As 
the 1960s began, the Japanese media began to speculate about the prospects for 
the coming decade. Commissioned by the editorial board of the Weekly Reader 
(Shūkan dokushojin), Takeuchi Yoshimi wrote an article discussing the outlook 
listing the tasks for public discourse in the 1960s. Anxious about the potential 
for ultranationalism to reemerge if the public discourse excluded or ignored 
“national things,” Takeuchi (1981b, 60) suggested some preventative measures:
I would like to suggest that public discourse adopt a common agenda with 
respect to 1968: Should we commemorate the Meiji Restoration centennial or 
not? If so, how exactly should we carry out this commemoration? Personally, I 
hope the Meiji Restoration centennial will be an event defining the “golden 
sixties.” I would like to see a campaign depicting the future of the revolution, 
correcting the factual distortions and twisted sense of history regarding the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the US signed one hundred 
years ago, and dealing with the nostalgia for National Foundation Day…. What 
are national things? What is tradition? The answers to such questions cannot be 
left to the nationalists. There is a need for the pro-West and pro-Japan factions to 
confront each other. (Takeuchi 1981b, 62-63)
Takeuchi thus appealed for public debate regarding “Meiji Restoration 
centennial” in the 1960s. Of importance was his imperative that the pro-West 
and pro-Japan factions within the national intelligentsia cooperatively prioritize 
this matter. This would help to offset historical distortions regarding the Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the US (pro-West faction) and 
nostalgia for National Foundation Day (pro-Japan faction). Also notable was his 
recommendation that the “modernist” French literature specialist Kuwabara 
Takeo (1904-88) lead the campaign to promote the Meiji centennial discourse 
(Takeuchi 1981b, 63).
According to the author of Modernism (Kindai shugi, 1964) Hidaka Rokurō 
(1917-2018), “modernist” was at this moment a pejorative term describing “those 
with modernist tendencies,” while the term “modernism” was synonymous with 
4. Regarding the formation of social memory surrounding the slogan, “It is no longer the 
‘postwar,’” see Shimizu (2015).
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“westernization.” These conceptions reflected the fact that one of the most 
important problems with “modernism” in Japanese history since the Meiji 
Restoration had been the conflation of “modernization and Westernization” 
(Hidaka 1964, 7, 10).5 Takeuchi here also used “modernism” in a highly judgmental 
sense. In his view, “modernism” was a general term for cultural matters that 
excluded “any consideration of the nation” (Takeuchi 1981a, 32). In that case, 
why would he have recommended a “modernist” such as Kuwabara?
A representative example of a postwar “modernist” intellectual collective was 
the “Lectures School” (Kōzaha), an influential group of Marxist historians in 
postwar Japan. According to the Lectures School, Meiji-era Japanese society was 
a remnant of feudal society that concluded in the totalitarianism of emperor 
worship and military dictatorship. At this moment in which the Meiji period 
was generally viewed as “feudal,” an article entitled “A Reevaluation of Meiji” 
appeared in the Asahi Newspaper (Kuwabara 1956). In this article, “modernist” 
Kuwabara presented his theory of why the Meiji period was so negatively 
evaluated. This theory, presenting a more positive assessment of the period, 
greatly affected Takeuchi’s perception of Japan’s modernists.6 He considered that 
this shift provided an intuitive platform for the “future of the revolution” he 
imagined.
In terms of elucidating this idea of “revolution,” Kuwabara argued that the 
Meiji period witnessed a national commitment to independence and desire for 
modernization that needed to be reevaluated from a “progressive position.” The 
reason for this was that, although Japan had displayed many flaws and 
contradictions over its recent history, there was no hope for the future without 
recognizing the Meiji Restoration as a great national achievement (Kuwabara 
1956). Kuwabara had arrived at this theory reconciling a modernist position 
with a positive view of the Meiji period after visiting the Soviet Union and 
China in 1955, where he found the Meiji Restoration portrayed as a “revolution.” 
This experience is also discernible in Kuwabara’s use of certain terms in “A 
Reevaluation of Meiji,” such as “revolution,” “nation,” and “China”—all terms 
sympathetic to Takeuchi’s intellectual disposition. In turn, in an article entitled 
“Meiji Restoration Centennial: Thoughts and Suggestions” (Takeuchi 1980b),7 
5. According to Wada Haruki’s (1938- ) classification, however, here “modernization” refers to 
“classical modernization” (i.e. modernism), distinct from “contemporary modernization theory” 
(i.e. 1960s “modernization theory”) (Wada 1966, 3).
6. Takeuchi was shocked to encounter a modernist evaluation of Meiji that was positive (Kuwabara 
et al. 1962, 178-79). Kuwabara also stated that he and Takeuchi possessed similar as well as 
different qualities (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 155).
7. Originally published in Science of Thought (Shisō no kagaku, November 1961).
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Takeuchi insisted that his suggestions went no further than “Kuwabara’s com- 
mentary” (Takeuchi 1980b, 236-37). Endowed with an excellent journalistic sense 
and able to attract the attention of both the pro-West and pro-Japan factions, 
Kuwabara’s work was widely considered to have ushered in a “golden age of 
cooperative research” in the 1950s (Suzuki 2014, 120). This was the reason why 
Takeuchi recommended this “modernist” to lead the Meiji centennial discourse.
1. The Encounter with Modernization Theory: “Meiji as Modernity”
Takeuchi’s public discussion of the Meiji Restoration centennial commenced in 
a January 1962 Central Review (Chūō kōron) article entitled “The Meaning of the 
Meiji Restoration: Tasks of the Ninety-Fifth Year” (Kuwabara et al. 1962). 
Matsushima Eiichi (1917-2002) mediated the discussion between Kuwabara, 
Takeuchi, and Hani Gorō (1901-83). The Central Review editorial board declared 
its aim in the article to devote the year 1962 to reevaluating the Meiji Restoration as 
the “basis for contemporary Japan’s modernization” (176). In this respect, Takeuchi 
also elaborated his suggestion to discuss the Meiji centennial in terms of moder- 
nization.
Perhaps the danger of yet another surprise outbreak persists because we could 
not stop the rise of Japanese fascism during the war and relied on some other 
force…. Modernism [alone] doesn’t quite guarantee a positive result. So, in a 
broad sense, perhaps one might observe the need for more national or nativist 
aspects. It should essentially be modernization based on these kinds of aspects…. 
So, occasionally they’re criticized as nationalists and sometimes more severely as 
fascists, but I argue that perhaps these kinds of people are also necessary. There is 
the idea that we can forego rediscovering or re-excavating the Meiji Restoration, 
forget the Meiji Restoration itself, and simply begin in 1945, but I don’t think 
that’s quite adequate. In this respect, perhaps we should reconsider the modern- 
ization of Japan in terms of continuity with the Meiji Restoration. It was in 
thinking about this that the term “Meiji Restoration centennial” came to me. 
(Kuwabara et al. 1962, 177-78)
Here, just as he had two years before, Takeuchi expresses the idea that a focus on 
modernism, which excluded a nationalist perspective, would be powerless to 
oppose a fascist nationalist backlash. A more fundamental basis for the “postwar” 
national discourse was needed, which required the mediation of nationalist and 
nativist perspectives, and this would require the rediscovery or the creation of 
continuity with the achievements of the Meiji Restoration.
Hani Gorō, the discussant representing the Lectures School, pointed out the 
logical ambiguity of Takeuchi’s “nativist aspects”: “Japan’s modernization problem is 
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not a problem of transistors but of the Japanese people” (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 
180-82). Hani, a popular figure and self-acknowledged modernist, here also 
acknowledged the limits of modernism, and the precise limits he acknowledged 
were the “people.” Meanwhile, Takeuchi agreed with Hani’s opinion that “moder- 
nization” should be measured not in terms of material indices (industrialization, 
imperialism) but the “freedom of the people.” However, he questioned whether 
the “people,” as an idealized category, could actually exist as a historical subject 
(182). Confronted by each other’s logical ambiguity and conceptual uncertainty, 
then, the critic of modernism Takeuchi and the modernist Hani concluded their 
discussion without being able to reconcile their notions of “nation” and the 
“people.”
Kuwabara, the other modernist in the discussion, argued that “one could not 
discuss modernization without material factors.” Stipulating the various elements 
of “modernization” as “individualism, democracy, industrialization, capitalism, 
national education, national army,” and so forth, he declared Meiji modernization 
“insufficient” in terms of the development of democracy and individualism but 
“successful overall” (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 177). This echoed the evaluation of 
Meiji by Edwin O. Reischauer (1910-90), a representative modernization theory 
historian of the 1960s. Just a year earlier, a special Central Review issue (September 
1961) on “Japan’s modernization” featured a well-known discussion between 
Reischauer and Nakayama Ichirō (1898-1980) entitled “A Reevaluation of Japanese 
Modernization.” Reischauer argued that modern Japan was characterized by 
certain problems such as militarism, but that Japan’s modernization was 
generally a great success (Reischauer and Nakayama 1961, 97). In this respect, 
Kuwabara was recognized as following Reischauer’s line of reasoning.
In an interview with Takeuchi entitled “One Hundred Years of Japan’s 
Modernity,” however, Kuwabara objected to modernization theory’s portrayal of 
Japan’s modernization as a “model” for continental Asia and Africa, denying the 
claim that “Kuwabara = Reischauer.” He insisted that in continental Asia and 
Africa, which he simplistically considered to have uniformly long been under 
colonial rule, there existed no historical development as had been accumulated 
over three hundred years of Tokugawa Japan. Furthermore, he even argued that 
the people of these places were “not as diligent as the Japanese” (Kuwabara and 
Takeuchi 1970, 160-62).8 Despite the overt flaws of this assessment, 1960s 
modernization theorists, including Reischauer (1997, 29-35), commonly touted 
this theory of endogenous modernization, which emphasized the similarity 
8. The interview was conducted in October 1964, three months before its publication in Kyodo 
News (Kyōdō tsūshin).
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Table 1. The elements of modernization (Kuwabara 1964)9
(1) Political democracy
(2) Concentration of capital for the national economy
(3)  Industrial transition from handicrafts to factories (particularly, advancement and 
mechanization of science and technology) 
(4) Nationwide compulsory education
(5) Establishment of national army for national defense
(6)  In terms of consciousness, liberation from the community and the maturation of 
individualism
Table 2. The characteristics of a modernized society (AAS 1960; Hall 1961, 44-45)
(1) A comparatively high degree of urbanization
(2) Widespread literacy
(3) Comparatively high per capita income
(4) Extensive geographical and social movement
(5)  Relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization within the economy
(6) An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media
(7)  Widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern 
social and economic processes
(8)  A relatively highly organized bureaucratic form of government with widespread 
involvement by members of the society
(9)  An increasingly rational and secular orientation of the individual to his environment 
based on the growth of scientific knowledge
between the Tokugawa regime and Western feudal institutions and the idea that 
the Tokugawa era witnessed the sprouting of Japanese modernization. This 
somewhat reduced the persuasiveness of Kuwabara’s denial of “Kuwabara = 
Reischauer.”
Meanwhile, Kuwabara had already theorized the elements of “modernization” 
in his article “Tradition and Modernity” (Dentō to kindai 1964 [originally 
published in 1957]) (table 1), prior to the listing of the features of modern societies 
9. Regarding the relationship between these elements and Japan’s “modernization,” Kuwabara 
(1964, 211) regarded the first and sixth as “unsuccessful” and the rest as “successful.”
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by American scholars at the Hakone Conference (August – September 1960) 
(table 2).10 As shown in table 1, by first listing “political democracy,” Kuwabara 
conformed to the perspective of the Japanese scholars who attended the Hakone 
Conference. As mentioned above, the public debate over the Meiji centennial 
began in the January 1962 issue of Central Review. Here, the editorial board had 
declared the focus to be on reevaluating “modernization” and the Meiji, with 
respect to a planned extension of the 1961 special issue on “Japan’s modernization” 
(Kuwabara et al. 1962, 176). In turn, the special issue itself had been a con- 
tinuation of modernization theory introduced through the Hakone Conference 
held in the summer of 1960. Through these discussions, mediated by the 
discourse surrounding the Meiji centennial and modernization theory, the 
mainstream early postwar image of Meiji as “(semi-)feudal” was transformed, and 
the period was recast as the foundations of Japan’s “modernity.” 
2.  The Two “Modernizations” of the Postwar Era: “Transformation” and 
“Modernization”
The term “modernization” began as a methodological concept used by American 
historians and sociologists (Kawashima 1963, 4). As chair of the Hakone 
Conference John W. Hall (1916-97) made clear, the concept of “modernization” 
was essentially a “product of a scholarly system of classification” (Hall 1968, 14-15). 
It was also American academics who transplanted “modernization theory” to 
Japan. In the mid-1960s, observing “posters proclaiming ‘lifestyle modernization’ 
hung at bank tellers’ windows and advertisements with expressions such as ‘the 
modernization of tofu houses,’” Kaida Ikuo (1966) remarked that “the term 
‘modernization’ has been so widely discussed for a number of years now as to 
have become fashionable [in mainstream society]” (317).
These examples could be explained in terms of the global influence of 
American modernization theory in the 1960s, but there is room to consider the 
independent context of “post-postwar” Japan, in which populist sentiment and 
culture was equally important. Ushering in a new era under the slogan “It is no 
longer the ‘postwar,’” Japan’s July 1956 White Paper (Keizai Kikakuchō 1956) 
conveyed a particular conception of “modernization” that preceded the 
popularization of modernization theory in the 1960s. Declarations of “the end of 
the postwar” began with literary critic Nakano Yoshio’s (1903-85) article entitled 
“It is No Longer the ‘Postwar,’” published in the February 1956 edition of Literary 
10. Fourteen Western scholars, including Reischauer, and fifteen Japanese scholars, including 
Maruyama Masao (1914-96), attended the conference. 
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Spring and Autumn (Bungei shunjū). Arguing that the term “postwar” had been 
used to acquit Japan of its past crimes, Nakano sought to end and historicize the 
“postwar” (Nakano 1956, 57). Additionally, he argued that in this new era the 
post-postwar Japan should seek a “wise and rational” approach to international 
relations and a new generation of leaders, and as a “minor nation,” pursue a new 
idea of “human happiness” while discarding “imperial delusions” (58-66).
The idea that “it is no longer the ‘postwar’” emerged in this context. Referenced 
in the 1956 White Paper, this notion developed into a popular and timely slogan 
for an era that emphasized expansive economic development. Yet, within the 
White Paper, there was no mention of a “bright future” in the post-postwar era. 
The document rather described how Japan’s rapid postwar economic recovery 
was possible due to the revitalizing power of reconstruction and the amicable 
global situation at the time but that this era was now over, and “modernization” 
now provided the only path forward for the Japanese economy. The White 
Paper’s basic conclusion was that “modernization” should be the national goal of 
the “post-postwar era,” an ambition that would require renewed will and deter- 
mination.
The notable point here is the association between the “post-postwar” era and 
“modernization.” The White Paper defined “modernization” as a “process of 
self-remodeling” and used the term interchangeably with “transformation” 
(Keizai Kikakuchō 1956). While “modernization” eventually became the 
dominant term in 1960s Japan, at this point modernization and transformation 
were widely used interchangeably, and both were often deployed in economic 
discourses. The 1960s term “modernization” thus naturally succeeded the term 
“transformation” during the late 1950s. In this respect, it could even be said that 
“modernization” ushered in the 1960s. Regarding 1960s modernization theory, 
its most intrinsic characteristic was its transplantation to Japan by American 
scholars. However, as with the term “modernization,” there is room for examining 
how the dissemination of modernization theory in Japan was mediated relative 
to the unique national context.
The Heterogenous Cold War Space: The Distortion of “Meiji 
Restoration Centennial” Discourse
In the discussion with Takeuchi on “One Hundred Years of Japan’s Modernity” 
(Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970),11 Kuwabara described that it was Takeuchi who 
11. This discussion was conducted in October 1964.
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had first called for a public debate on the “national issue.” Prompted by this 
comment, Takeuchi offered the following recollection:
Perhaps this was in 1946 or 1947. While dealing with the nationalism in Asia 
issue at the IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations], Owen Lattimore’s [Professor at 
Leeds University and authority on Asian issues] perspective was also introduced 
to Japan. There was something somewhat disturbing about the idea of nationalism 
appearing in Asia at a time when it was totally absent from Japan and thought to 
have completely disappeared from the world…. It was around this time, when the 
strength to consider nationalism once again was gradually gathering, that Mr. 
Kuwabara published his essay, “A Reevaluation of Meiji.” I think there was a 
gradual shift in mood at this time toward viewing nationalism as an unavoidable 
and undeniable fact. (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 157-58) 
Piecing Kuwabara and Takeuchi’s recollections together, it is possible to 
discern that discourse on the “nation” reemerged in postwar Japan under the 
influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations’ (IPR, 1925-61) highlighting of 
nationalism in Asia. Takeuchi first raised this issue in the early 1950s, followed 
by Kuwabara in the late 1950s with “A Reevaluation of Meiji,” and Takeuchi 
again in the 1960s with his proposed “Meiji Restoration centennial” discourse.
The specific event that Takeuchi references in the passage above was the 
IPR’s eleventh Pacific Conference held October 3-15, 1950: “Nationalism in the 
Far East and Its International Influence.” Takeuchi (1981a) first referred to the 
conference as the “Lucknow Conference” in “Modernism and the National 
Problem” published in the September 1951 issue of Literature (Bungaku), arguing 
that Japan would be able to reestablish relations within the “‘proper’ nationalism 
of Asian states” only when it had resolved its own “national (minzoku) problem” 
(34). Here, Takeuchi related the IPR Lucknow Conference to the reopening of 
postwar “national” discourse to demonstrate the association between the latter 
and the international movement known as “nationalism in Asia.”12 In linking the 
Meiji centennial discourse with the much earlier Lucknow Conference of 1951, 
moreover, perhaps he desired to distance this discourse from the Meiji boom 
engendered by the popularization of modernization theory in the 1960s. 
Takeuchi here seemed to perceive that the “Meiji reevaluation” offered by Walt 
Whitman Rostow (1916-2003)13 and Reischauer’s modernization theory 
12. Regarding Takeuchi’s Asian nationalism and Japanese nationalism, see Lee Kyunghee (2019a, 
174-205).
13. Another joint discussion focusing on the modernization of the Japanese economy in light of 
Rostow’s (1959, 1960) theory of economic growth was held in Japan in the summer of 1960, hosted 
by the Japan Cultural Forum.
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foreshadowed the discourse of “Japan as a great power” (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 
1970, 160). However, Takeuchi’s comments in this regard are relatively opaque, 
and it is therefore difficult to fully extract his position on the matter.
With regards to the continuity between Meiji centennial discourse and those 
of the “nation,” which had reemerged under the influence of the IPR Lucknow 
Conference, another aspect of the Japanese context was particularly relevant. 
Through its publication Pacific Affairs, the IPR had begun to display a “pro-
China, anti-Japan” partisanship as Japan’s relations with China completely 
unraveled. After international criticism of Japan mounted following the com- 
mencement of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan formally seceded 
from the IPR in 1939 (Nagao 1985, 7-11). However, in the US in the 1950s, the 
pro-China IPR became a victim of the anti-communist purge that spread in the 
wake of House Representative Joseph Raymond McCarthy’s (1908-57) speech on 
February 9, 1950. In 1955, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked the IPR’s 
tax-exempt status as a non-profit organization, and the IPR struggled with 
financial difficulties before disbanding in 1961.14 Meanwhile, the Association for 
Asian Studies (AAS) had established the Modern Japan Research Association in 
1958, initiating the Modernization of Japan Research Project (Hakone, 1960). 
Thus, following the dissolution of the IPR, which had been the dominant 
American research institute focused on East Asia prior to the war, the core of 
research on Japan in the US shifted to the AAS, and this suited those scholars in 
the US seeking to make a more positive assessment of the imperial Meiji Era.
Amidst the anti-communist atmosphere that prevailed in the wake of the 
Lucknow Conference, the idea that nationalism in Asia was a useful “aspiration 
for liberation and independence” became all but heresy. Instead, the “red hand 
of Moscow” was seen as being behind the rising tide of nationalism (Sasaki 
1998, 271). In Japan, however, the reemergence of the discourse on “nation” as 
Japan reestablished its ties with the IPR was relatively free of interference from 
McCarthyism, ironically due to its disassociation with the organization since 
1939. At the same time, there is a need to consider how this dynamic may have 
assuaged postwar Japan’s sense of historical guilt with respect to Asia. The IPR 
Asia Conference was held for the first time in fifteen years in Kyoto, Japan in 
1954.15 As the first international conference held in postwar Japan (Yamaoka 
2010, 6), this could have had the effect of announcing Japan’s readmittance to 
international society. The reopening of the “nation” discourse in Japan in the 
14. The cessation of Rockefeller Foundation (RF) support in the 1950s was also related to suspicion 
over the IPR’s “leftist bias.” See Sasaki (2003).
15. The theme at this time was “Economic, Political, and Social Problems Related to Improving 
Living Standards in the Far East.” The IPR conference in Kyoto was the first held since 1929. 
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1950s under IPR influence therefore developed into the Meiji centennial 
discourse of the 1960s, and the enthusiasm for reevaluating the Meiji era that 
arose in turn, then also encountered the modernization theory promoted by the 
AAS. For this reason, the “nation” discourse that resumed in postwar Japan 
highlighted the shift from the influence of the IPR to that of the AAS. Therefore, 
it would be accurate to state that the combined influence of the IPR and AAS 
led to the Meiji boom of the 1960s. However, for the Meiji boom to occur, it was 
important that Japan first discovered the “postwar vicennial,” as this experience 
was an influential component of the discourse surrounding the “Meiji 
centennial” that emerged in the 1960s.
The Birth of “Meiji versus Postwar” and Economic Nationalism
 
1. The Preceding “Postwar Vicennial”: The Birth of “Meiji versus Postwar”
In April 1965, the Asahi Newspaper featured eight articles in a series entitled 
“The Meiji Centennial and Postwar Vicennial.” An advertisement for the article 
stated the following: “To point out the problems of the book in question, a 
debate commences between Takeyama Michio, Noma Hiroshi, and eight other 
critics! Showdown between a leader who says the postwar is a delusion and an 
intellectual who says he will stand on the side of postwar democracy!” Here, the 
“book in question” was a bestseller released a month earlier, entitled Dangerous 
Intellectuals: Those Who Deny Postwar Democracy. In this, the author Yamada 
Munemutsu (1925- ) described the “dangerous intellectuals” as those who speak 
of “peace, democracy, and progressivism” as “delusions” (Yamada 1965, 3). 
Accompanying this accusation was a confrontational statement:
This manner of denying the postwar [denying the previous contexts of despotism 
and the war] is an attempt to place Japan once again within the frame of the 
Restoration, which walked the path of despotism and war for one hundred years. 
1968, three years from now, corresponds to the Meiji Restoration centennial. 
Those who deny the postwar intend to band together and use this as an 
opportunity. Will the Restoration centennial or the postwar vicennial win out? 
Japan’s future indeed depends on this outcome. As for myself, I shall stand on the 
side of the postwar vicennial. (Yamada 1965, 22)
Interpreting the dismissal of the importance of the “postwar” period as a 
“delusion” that equated to uncritical advocation of the national developments 
undertaken during the Meiji, and thus “despotism and war,” Yamada established 
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a clear opposition between the Meiji centennial and postwar vicennial. In this 
vein, the Asahi Newspaper editorial board devoted half of the articles in its 
special series to Yamada’s “dangerous intellectuals” (Takeyama Michio, Hayashi 
Kentarō, Etō Jun, and Hayashi Fusao) and the other half to commentators 
supporting postwar reform, crystallizing the confrontational configuration of 
“Meiji centennial versus postwar vicennial” (table 3).
Meanwhile, prior to the Asahi Newspaper series and Yamada’s Dangerous 
Intellectuals, Takeuchi returned to the pages of the Weekly Reader, the publication 
in which he had suggested his “Meiji Restoration centennial” discourse, to 
submit “A Five-Year Interim Report on the 1960s” (Takeuchi 1981c) on January 
11, 1965:
In my first article in 1960, I described my hope that the whole of Japanese 
modernity in the century since Meiji might be jointly confronted in the public 
Table 3. Asahi Newspaper “Meiji centennial and postwar vicennial” series
Meiji faction Postwar faction
Article 1 April 5, 1965 Article 2 April 6, 1965
Author Takeyama Michio (1903-84) Author Noma Hiroshi (1915-91)
Title
“Questioning the progressivist 
faith: Does history begin on 
August 15?”
Title
“Proceeding on the soil of 
peace: The new principles and 
methods of postwar society”
Article 3 April 7, 1965 Article 4 April 8, 1965
Author Hayashi Kentarō (1913-2004) Author Tōyama Shigeki (1914-2011)
Title
“Succession and development are 
historical realities: Raising the 
wrong problem”
Title “Ignoring the true needs of the nation”
Article 5 April 19, 1965 Article 6 April 20, 1965
Author Etō Jun (1932-99) Author Oda Minoru (1932-2007)
Title
“The trouble of abandoning the 
past: The deceit of a ‘safe 
intellectual’”
Title “Understanding the truth of the past”
Article 7 April 21, 1965 Article 8 April 22, 1965
Author Hayashi Fusao (1903-75) Author Katō Shūichi (1919-2008)
Title
“The need for a spiritual pillar: 
There is no essential difference 
between the two”
Title
“No retreat: The exhaustive 
postwar transformation of 
Meiji”
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sphere in the 1960s…. At the time, I was unable to foresee how Meiji would 
become a sensation in the way it has. It strikes me that the effect was somewhat 
excessive.
 However, if it is but memory at the root of this popularity, the creation of new 
ideas will be impossible. Remembering the Meiji state is a mere reaction to 
postwar democracy. Here, one cannot extract any immutable values. The search 
for the origins of the creation of the Meiji state, in other words, is the search to 
discover a way of objectifying the Meiji state—this is the meaning of com- 
memorating the Meiji centennial.
 Postwar democracy has produced its own particular fruits, but it is inadequate 
for settling history in that way. This means that postwar democracy, in truncating 
history, renders ambiguous the very basis of its own validity. The failure of 
postwar democracy to become a general theory is attested to by its performance 
over the past twenty years. We must seek an alternative. (Takeuchi 1981c, 391-92)
This interim report concerned the progress of the Meiji centennial discourse. 
Having witnessed the Meiji boom, Takeuchi declared the effect of the Meiji 
centennial discourse to have been excessive and focused on the unexpectedness 
of this result. What Takeuchi considered to be an even greater problem than this 
was the Meiji boom triggering and representing an “outpouring of memory” 
arising in reaction to the postwar democratic transformation. He declared that 
this obstructed an objective assessment of the Meiji era, and equally, it was 
divorced from “immutable values” and prevented the production of “new ideas.” 
However, he adopted the same critical position with respect to any accepting 
view of postwar democracy. In diagnosing the failure to critically analyze 
postwar democracy, he pointed to the false creation of a presumed rupture with 
the Meiji period. The logic by which Takeuchi had criticized “modernism” is 
also discernible here: He viewed postwar democracy as simply another form of 
modernism, namely, postwar modernism.
Japan had already declared the “end of the postwar” in the late 1950s. Yet this 
declaration had focused on the economic sector. With the end of the “economic 
postwar,” the rest of the “postwar” was thus now following suit. One may detect 
a hint of this in Takeuchi’s use of the term “postwar democracy” in the quoted 
passage above. It was in the 1960s that the term “postwar democracy” emerged 
(Oguma 2002, 16). Viewing publications at the time, the term “postwar 
democracy” appeared in magazines before newspapers. World (Sekai), 
representative of sophisticated postwar general-interest magazines, featured an 
article entitled “Postwar Democracy and the Parliamentary System” (August 
1962). Around the same time, the journal Science of Thought (Shisō no kagaku) 
featured an article entitled “War Responsibility and Postwar Democracy” 
(October 1962). These were followed by an Asahi Newspaper article, “Evaluation 
 “Meiji versus Postwar” in Cold War Japan  81
of and Reflections Regarding Postwar Democracy,” published on April 19, 1964. 
In the 1960s, the expression “postwar” thus came to be paired with “democracy.”
Takeuchi preceded Yamada in referencing the conflict between “Meiji” and 
the “postwar,” but unlike Yamada, who explicitly advocated the need to evaluate 
the developments of the “postwar” era as more important relative to the current 
state and aspirations for Japan, he distanced himself from either side. This was 
also the case within another important early text regarding the “Meiji versus 
postwar” question, namely, the 1964 confrontation between Ōkuma Nobuyuki 
(1893-1977), who declared postwar democracy a “delusion” (Ōkuma 1970, 163), 
and Maruyama Masao (1969, 585), who responded that the “delusion of postwar 
democracy” was preferable to a real and existent “Great Japanese Empire.” 
Takeuchi had thus raised the issue of the conflict between perspectives favoring 
the Meiji or the postwar prior to the publication of Yamada’s Dangerous 
Intellectuals, the Asahi Newspaper’s related article series, and Ōkuma and 
Maruyama’s later debate. 
Meanwhile, following the conclusion of the Asahi Newspaper special series, 
Takeuchi wrote a series of articles for the Tokyo Newspaper under the heading 
“Reflecting on the ‘Meiji Boom’” (May 17-18, 1965). Takeuchi (1980a, 244) 
declared that Yamada had demonstrated simplicity, inferiority, inaccuracy, and 
low standards in submitting his question—“Which will win, the Meiji centennial 
or postwar vicennial?” Nevertheless, he acknowledged this as a deft and well-
targeted journalistic strategy. He emphasized that any celebration of the Meiji 
centennial discourse, however, had nothing to do with choosing between “either 
Meiji or the postwar” (244). Declaring himself neither allied with nor opposed, 
but neutral with respect to Yamada, Takeuchi questioned the dualistic opposition 
of “Meiji versus the postwar”:
If someone asked whether I belong to the “Meiji” or “postwar” faction, I would 
not be able to answer. I think that if the postwar is real then Meiji is also real, and 
if the postwar is a delusion then Meiji is also a delusion. Perhaps this is an 
ambiguous position, but there is no other way to put it…. Yamada and I differ on 
this point. To me, the “postwar” is an ambiguous concept.
 Likewise, “Meiji” is also ambiguous…. In this sense, I cannot agree with 
Yamada’s method of representing “Meiji” in terms of despotism and aggression 
and the “postwar” in terms of peace and democracy…. It is a generally accepted 
idea that in history the first revolution cannot take root without the second. If the 
ongoing reaction cannot be reversed, at some point the “postwar” shall indeed 
become a delusion. (Takeuchi 1980a, 244)
Takeuchi thus questioned Yamada’s binary understanding of the Meiji and 
the postwar periods. This manner of skepticism came naturally to Takeuchi, 
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who had long criticized a binary, discontinuous view of history. In the passage, 
Takeuchi declared that the “first revolution” could not have succeeded without a 
further “second revolution.” The idea that the “first” Meiji revolution was of any 
substantial value without the subsequent postwar revolution was a fantasy. In 
other words, the reality of the “second” postwar revolution was in its consum- 
mation of the initial promise of the prior Meiji revolution. He thus argued that 
any assessment of the fruits of the first revolution and the reality of the second 
revolution could be established only on the basis of accepting the continuity 
between them.
2. The Meiji Centennial and Economic Nationalism
In 1965, the Asahi Newspaper featured a special series to address Yamada’s 
accusation against “dangerous intellectuals,” explicitly organizing the articles in 
terms of “Meiji versus the postwar.” While there were differing opinions on each 
side of the debate regarding the question, “Is it [more important to celebrate] the 
Meiji centennial or postwar vicennial?” the basic oppositional structure persisted 
across the eight articles included in the series. The positions of the interlocutors 
can be briefly summarized as follows (figure 1): 1) on the side of Meiji, a critique 
of the postwar “deception”; 2) on the side of the postwar, a critique of Meiji, 
which caused the war and defeat; 3) connecting the postwar and Meiji as a case 
of “successful modernization”; and 4) exploring the continuity between incom- 
plete reform (Meiji) and comprehensive reform (postwar). These positions can 
also be categorized in terms of the emphasis on rupture (1 and 2) versus 
continuity (3 and 4) between the Meiji and the postwar periods. The last two 
positions emphasizing continuity were especially opposed in terms of either 
marked support for Meiji (3) or the postwar (4).
To explore these different positions, it might be helpful to examine their 
relationship with 1960s modernization theory. Among the authors on the side of 
the postwar, Tōyama Shigeki and Katō Shūichi had attended the 1960 Hakone 
Conference. The ideological spectrum of the Japanese scholars who attended the 
Hakone Conference, including Maruyama Masao, was by no means narrow, but 
they all generally shared a critical perception of a value-free notion of 
“modernization theory” focused only on industrialization.16 In this respect, 
Tōyama was the most critical of “modernization theory.” He argued that 
modernization theory was unable to resolve various problems within contem- 
porary Asia, including the recent Vietnam conflict, and therefore he declared 
16. Regarding Japan’s “modernization theory” in the 1960s, see Lee Kyunghee (2019b).
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1) Meiji-postwar rupture (Meiji side) 2) Meiji-postwar rupture (postwar side)
“Even if we don’t have any underwear and 
lose half the population, we can still make 
a nuclear bomb…” (Article 1)
“The postwar cannot be directly connected 
with Meiji.” (Article 2)
3) Meiji-postwar continuity (Meiji side) 4) Meiji-postwar continuity (postwar side)
“Grandfather was really great!” (Article 3) “Heaven does not make a man above a 
man, nor a man under a man.” (Article 8)
Figure 1. Editorial cartoons for each article in the series17
Reischauer’s modernization theory to be essentially lacking in value. Additionally 
he asserted that it was the Japanese people’s wartime experience that led to their 
urgent demand for democratic reform in the early postwar period. And to 
emphasize the autonomous development of the postwar democracy, he argued 
that the intentions and actions of the nation’s people themselves during the 
postwar period constituted the crucial arena through which the principles of 
peace and democracy had been observed (Tōyama 1965).
While differentiating between democratic institutions, values, and system of 
17. Cartoons drawn by Yokoyama Taizō (1917-2007)
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livelihood, Katō Shūichi argued that to understand postwar democracy it had to 
be compared and connected to the Meiji Restoration and the problems that had 
arisen over the century since. The Meiji reforms, he claimed, had been essentially 
democratically oriented in terms of institutions, values, and livelihood, if perhaps 
to a lesser degree then in the postwar era. Moreover, despite traversing the rupture 
and distortions caused by the First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and 
Second Sino-Japanese War, these improvements only became more thoroughly 
realized in the postwar era. This focus on democracy, which American scholars 
had largely ignored or neglected in their conceptions, demonstrated a certain 
distance to the mainstream US 1960s modernization theory.
Meanwhile, standing on the side of Meiji, Hayashi Kentarō represented a 
historiographical view closest to that of 1960s modernization theory.18 Hayashi 
had previously demonstrated an active understanding of Reischauer’s moderni- 
zation theory two years earlier in an interview with Reischauer (“A new perspec- 
tive on modern history” [Kindaishi no atarashii mikata], Jiyū [Freedom], March 
1963).19 Unlike the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, Hayashi 
argued, Japan (a defeated country) was able to join the ranks of the advanced 
countries due to it possessing the preexisting basis for a modern state. In other 
words, Japan’s postwar advance was attributable to the “digestive power” of 
reforms cultivated through the “great enterprise of the Meiji Restoration” (Hayashi 
1965). Yet Hayashi also demonstrated the blind spot of “modernization theory,” 
in that his focus on industrialization meant praising the “Meiji century” while 
foregoing any political criticism of the “pre-war ‘old regime’” (Dōke 2015, 114).
Takeuchi had declared the 1950s “the era in which the revival of modernism 
shall restore the balance to renew [the confrontation with nationalism]” (Takeuchi 
1981a, 35, 37). In the 1960s, he argued that the initiative needed to be seized over 
the national issue, as he feared that a weakened notion of “nation” might lead to 
ultranationalism. Here, he emphasized a self-regulated, self-initiated political 
discourse, not one led by transitory trends and sloganeering (Takeuchi 1981b, 
60). Nevertheless, he made no protest regarding the congenial relations between 
18. Unlike the Japanese scholars who attended the Hakone Conference in the 1960s, Hayashi 
Kentarō was quite an active proponent of “modernization theory.” Two months after the Asahi 
Newspaper series ended, he attended a history conference on “Asia’s Traditional Societies and 
Modernization.” This conference was part of a larger international academic conference (held at 
Walker Hill Hotel, June 28 – July 7, 1965) on “The Problem of Modernization in Asia,” which a 
part of the sixtieth anniversary commemoration for the founding of the Asiatic Research Institute, 
Koryŏ University (“Asia e issŏ sŏ” 1965). See Kim In-su (2017).
19. The interview was included in Reischauer’s 1965 book published in Japan, A New Perspective on 
Japanese Modernity (Nihon kindai no atarashii mikata). A Korean translation was published in 
1997 under the title Japan’s Modernization Theory (Ilbon ŭi kŭndaehwaron, Reischauer 1997).
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the pro-West and pro-Japan factions that had been occasioned relative to their 
coalescing of the energies of modernization theory and the reappraisals of the 
Meiji era in the 1960s.
On April 15, 1966, the Cabinet inaugurated the Meiji Centennial Commem- 
oration Preparation Committee. At its first meeting (May 4), the committee 
chose October 23, 1968 as the day to commemorate the Meiji centennial (“Muttsu 
no kisan” 1966). At the second meeting (May 26), sub-committees were 
established to oversee the various details of the commemoration, such as the 
pre-ceremony, events, enterprises, public relations, etc.20 A month later (June 
13), Takeuchi announced his withdrawal from the Meiji centennial discourse. A 
week later, Japan Socialist Party declared opposition to Meiji centennial com- 
memoration (“‘Shin kenpō nijū nen’” 1966). On October 25, 1967, the History 
Research Association, History and Science Consortium, and History Educators 
Consortium jointly published an “Appeal for an Opposition Movement against 
the ‘Meiji Centennial’” in the Asahi Newspaper.21 As the government began to 
prepare in earnest for the commemoration, intellectuals raised their voices in 
criticism (“Meiji hyaku nen” 1967; “Uyokuka aoru” 1967). It was around this 
time, when Takeuchi withdrew from the “Meiji Restoration centennial” discourse, 
that the “Meiji boom” of the 1960s adopted the antagonistic configuration of 
establishment versus anti-establishment.
As mentioned above, October 23 was chosen as the day on which to com- 
memorate the Meiji centennial. This was a logical decision, since this date 
marked the commencement of the “Meiji era” in 1868. However, the Meiji 
Centennial Commemoration Planning Committee, composed of government 
officials, representatives of various private organizations, scholars, historians, 
and cultural specialists, had considered other dates. Discussions on the topic of a 
20. The preliminary 1967 government budget with respect to the commemorative enterprise 
allocated 403,994,000 yen for the “homeland greening” project, 2,254,000 yen for the “preservation 
and illumination of history” project, and 142,246,000 yen for the “boat of youth” project 
(Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 1967, 83). By comparison, the Ford Foundation research fund for the 
Modernization of Japan Research Project of the Modern Japan Research Association was 
48,600,000 yen (135,000 US dollars).
21. The appeal began as follows: “The government has determined to hold a nationwide celebra- 
tion of the ‘Meiji centennial’ next year on October 23, planning such events as the ‘homeland 
greening,’ ‘preservation and illumination of history,’ and ‘boat of youth’ projects. The ‘2,600 years 
since national foundation’ was commemorated in the past up until the onset of the Pacific War 
(1940). This played a role in mobilizing the national spirit in the name of fascism and aggressive 
wars through an ideology of ultranationalism (chōkokka shugi) and slogans such as ‘hakkō ichiu’ 
(all the world under one roof) and ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’ Now, for the following 
reasons, we cannot but regard the approaching ‘Meiji Restoration centennial’ with a similar 
apprehension” (Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 1967, 87). 
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suitable date had also taken place in the national media. According to a March 
16, 1966 Asahi Newspaper article, “Six Documents for Determining the Origin, 
When is the Meiji Centennial?” the six candidates were: 1) the Meiji emperor’s 
succession to the throne (February 13, 1967); 2) the resignation of the Tokugawa 
shogun (November 10, 1967); 3) the emperor’s edict declaring the restoration of 
imperial rule (January 3, 1968); 4) the reading of the Imperial “Charter Oath” 
(April 6, 1968); 5) the coronation of the Meiji emperor (October 12, 1968); and 
6) the formal calendrical inauguration of the “Meiji” era (October 23, 1968) 
(“Muttsu no kisan shiryō” 1966). “October 23” thus won out among these six 
competing dates. John W. Hall, another 1960s “modernization theory” historian, 
expressed surprise at this result—he had expected the third or fourth date to be 
selected. However, he surmised that October 23 was chosen to avoid controversy 
and unwarranted suspicion (Hall 1969, 104), as excluding those dates which 
were directly linked to the implementation of imperial rule, only the sixth 
candidate remained. The selection of the 23 October could also be considered as 
a politically “safe” decision, given the objections of the opposition regarding the 
dangers of celebrating the last imperial era.
While advocates for the “postwar vicennial” were critical of the convenient 
alliance forged between advocates for the Meiji centennial and those of 
modernization theory, “for most people, ‘modernization theory,’ which reflected 
a positive reality, was more persuasive than the left’s denial of reality and their 
proposed future socialist revolution” (Dōke 2015, 115-16). In this respect, the 
government’s selection of the 23 October could hardly be considered a decision 
made out of “generosity.” In the January 10, 1968 edition of the Asahi Newspaper, 
an article, “Ginza Ondo, Another ‘Tokyo Song’: Shopping District Brimming 
with Vitality as ‘Meiji Centennial’ Approaches,” introduced the lyrics and 
announced the release of iconic postwar singer-actress Misora Hibari’s (1937-89) 
song “Ginza Ondo.”22 The article also described how Ginza had launched a 
preparatory committee for a festival (matsuri) to be held for ten days beginning 
on October 11 to celebrate the Meiji centennial. Furthermore, the article stated 
that the Meiji centennial would be directly commemorated through the work of 
“our hands.” This was because “Ginza had been the first site of modern 
buildings, trains, and electric lights and served as the origin point of Meiji 
culture,” and as such the article declared that 150 million yen would be allocated 
to stage the “Ginza Festival of the World” (“Ginza ondo ‘Tokyo no uta’” 1968). In 
this manner, a celebratory atmosphere was voluntarily produced by members of 
the public on the eve of the government’s Meiji centennial commemoration 
22. Lyrics by Saijō Yaso (1892-1970).
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ceremony (October 23). A discourse focused on economic nationalism, supported 
by the success story of “Meiji = modernity,” modernization theory, and the high 
economic growth of the nation through “post-postwar” (“modernization”), was thus 
widely stimulated in the public imagination.
Conclusion
The Meiji Centennial Commemoration Ceremony commenced as planned at 
the Nippon Budōkan on October 23, 1968. Three months later, John W. Hall 
(1969) published an article entitled “The Attitude of Evaluating Modern Japan” 
in Central Review. Upon the occasion of the Meiji centennial, he discussed the 
Meiji Restoration in terms of commonalities with the 1776 US Declaration of 
Independence in Philadelphia. The Meiji period and the Philadelphia declaration, 
he observed, both provided the “origins of new nations formed according to 
modern principles.” In common, they shared the goal of “nation-building rather 
than social reconstruction,” due to “international crises provoking concerns over 
political independence” (103).
Perhaps the most remarkable part of this essay is provided by Hall’s claim 
that value-free research on Japanese modernization had revealed an optimistic 
interpretation of modern Japanese history as a success story, “lacking violence, 
revolution, class, ideology, and other such elements.” Meanwhile, he acknowledged 
the possible criticism of this approach as a product of “insensitivity, affluence, or 
‘bourgeois objectivity’” (Hall 1969, 111).
Ten years later, in an article entitled “‘Modernization Theory’ and East Asia: 
The Case of American Scholarly Associations,” Marius B. Jansen (1922-2000), 
another one of the Hakone Conference attendees, confessed that he had come to 
understand modernization theory as an “intellectual mushroom cloud” 
produced for use in the Cold War (Jansen 1978, 28). This belated realization 
occurred with the generational change in Japanese Studies researchers, yielding 
the likes of John W. Dower (1938- ) and Harry Harootunian (1929- ). As this 
third generation of scholars set out to criticize the modernization theory of their 
predecessors they arrived at a different perspective than their antecessors, not 
least in positively reappraising the ill-fated Herbert Norman’s (1909-57) approach 
to the study of Japanese history.23 However, and as discussed within this paper, 
Japanese scholars had long ago raised such criticism of modernization theory in 
23. A central figure in the IPR who was also well known as the author of The Establishment of the 
Modern State in Japan (1940), Herbert Norman (1909-57) committed suicide after coming under 
suspicion of being a Soviet spy.
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the 1960s. This fact notwithstanding, it was only with the emergence of this 
criticism within Japanese Studies research in the US that their voices began to be 
heard within an international scholarly arena.
Nonetheless, the myth of Japanese success continued to boom as before. It 
was in 1979 that Ezra Vogel published Japan as Number One, a classic that 
garnered global attention. Japan’s economic nationalism, which had paved the 
way for the Meiji centennial discourse, modernization theory, and the idea of 
the “postwar as a delusion” continued to persist after Japan as Number One. 
Economic nationalism, which had displaced ultranationalism, was another form 
of popular nationalism that Takeuchi had failed to adequately anticipate when 
he asserted his idea for a Meiji centennial discourse.
Regarding the intellectual effectiveness of seizing the initiative with respect 
to the national issue in the 1960s as a way of obstructing the development of 
ultranationalism, the opportunity for any thorough substantiation of this 
possibility was precluded by the advent of economic nationalism. Be that as it 
may, perhaps revisiting the development of the Meiji centennial discourse may 
provide a meaningful point of reference within contemporary Japan. Not least 
as apprehensions over the crisis of democracy and an ascending extreme right—
concerns compounded by the “lost three decades” of national economic 
stagnation—are once again surging. 
To effectively achieve the task of creating the kind of liberal thinking proposed 
by Katō and Azuma, and follow Takeuchi’s critical analysis of nationalism, it will 
be necessary to first theorize and deconstruct the still pervasive ideology of 
“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians.” To complete this substantive task, the 
initiative must be seized in political debates both within and without the public 
sphere, as well as inside and outside Japan.24
• Translated by Keiran MACRAE
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